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BACK TO THE BOG? SUBRICK, SELF-INTEREST, AND 
SOCIALIST CALCULATION 
          Eric Crampton and Andrew Farrant 
We welcome the opportunity to clarify our argument (CF 2004) and to respond to Bob 
Subrick’s pointed queries regarding robust political economy. In particular we shall focus 
on Subrick’s claim (2004, p.3) that the Austrian theory of how the worst get on top has 
not been refuted by the empirical record. We will address Subrick’s claim in the 
conclusion to this response. Firstly, however, we wish to clarify certain points in our 
argument (CF 2004), points which Subrick argues lead us to “overstate the implications 
of … [our] results” (Subrick 2004, p.3). 
Subrick (p.6) challenges our simple perfectly-price discriminating monopolist/monopolist 
planner analogy, suggesting that we simply assert diminishing marginal utility of income. 
Whether or not DMU occurs at one hundred thousand, one million, or one trillion dollars 
per year is largely immaterial to the intuitively plausible claim that in an economy where 
one agent (our monopoly planner) extracts all surplus, the said planner places a lower 
marginal valuation on a dollar than does a hapless citizen selected at random. Subrick 
(p.7) also argues that all “is not well” with our median welfare standard. While Subrick’s 
point and arguments are well taken, we are explicit tha t we use the median so as to avoid 
the problem of outliers in the distribution (namely, the monopoly planner). While the 
median is not computed by incorporating all sample observations, we argue that under the 
conditions we posit – a monopoly planner able to engage in perfect inframarginal surplus 
or rent extraction – all sample observations bar one (the monopoly planner) enjoy epsilon 
utility. Diminishing marginal utility of income aside in this example, use of a mean 
welfare standard would overstate the welfare of the average citizen. While the planner 
allocates resources such as to replicate the first-best competitive outcome, the modal 
citizen enjoys epsilon surplus. We agree with Subrick that our “highly stylized” example 
is ultimately inadequate for empirically examining problems of imperfect information 
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and planner self- interest in order to make social welfare comparisons.6 That said, 
however, our aim was rather one of initiating – as Subrick recognizes – a discussion of 
the way in which imperfect information (less than perfect calculative efficacy) 
“exacerbates or inhibits the self- interest of public officials” (Subrick 2004, p.11). 
Subrick (pp.8-10) challenges our use of Olson’s roaming/stationary bandit model. We do 
not – contra Subrick (p.9) –  envisage our perfectly price discriminating monopolist-
planner as akin to Olson’s roaming bandit, but rather as more akin to Olson’s model 
(2000, pp.113-123) of a Soviet-type autocracy seeking to engage in inframarginal 
taxation or surplus extraction. A roaming bandit simply plunders whatever there is to 
plunder while paying little attention to incentives for future production (the available 
‘surplus’ is akin to a common pool resource), whereas our Stalinist planner is extremely 
concerned with incentives at the margin: The greater the degree of calculative efficacy, 
the more fine-tuned is inframarginal surplus extraction. We envisage our planner as 
having an Olsonian “encompassing interest” – thus allowing for greater surplus to 
extract. Subrick (p.10) correctly notes that the time-horizon of the bandit or planner plays 
a crucial role in determining any welfare ranking deriving from Olson’s model; our 
highly stylized example, however, presupposes that the planner has perfectly secure 
tenure in office.  Since our autocratic planner is perfectly extracting, it is unclear that 
reducing his time horizons would substantially reduce citizen utility. Under shorter time 
horizons, our planner still transfers everything to himself, but makes fewer capital 
investments having long-run payoffs. Under still shorter time horizons, he begins selling 
off the capital stock. Under all of these scenarios, citizen utility remains at epsilon. Only 
under the shortest of time horizons – where the planner literally sells the seed corn prior 
to absconding – will citizen utility drop from epsilon to negative: starvation soon 
following. 
We turn now to Subrick’s discussion of Austrian political economy and the empirical 
record (pp.4-5). We wholeheartedly agree with Subrick that Austrian political economy 
avoids providing explicit “institutional foundations for their analysis” (Subrick p.10). In 
                                                
6 Can “social welfare states” even be ‘truly’ ranked from an Austrian perspective?  
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the section of his paper ‘Do the Worst Get on Top?’ however, Subrick argues that while 
we challenge the Austrian hypothesis (the type of argument that Hayek makes in his 1944 
classic The Road to Serfdom) on empirical grounds (p.3), the evidence does not cut either 
way. We disagree, however, and argue that the Austrian argument of why the worst get 
on top is incoherent on its own grounds (namely, starting from a supposition of planner 
benevolence conjunct with a democratic polity), and that the history of the post-war 
Western democracies provide a test (albeit a rough and ready one) for Hayek’s claims.  
Subrick describes Boettke’s mechanism whereby benevolent planner inability to engage 
in economic calculation leads them to self-interested behavior (Boettke, 2001, p.52).  
Because planners lack the knowledge or information – the calculative efficacy – to 
maximize the utility of citizens, they consequently maximize their own utility instead. 
Subrick contends “that no controversial claim has been made.” (p. 4).  It seems 
incoherent to us, however, that planner self- interest should be viewed as coming into 
effect only when the planners realize their inability to rationally plan the economy, and 
that once they discover they lack the information to implement the socially efficient plan 
they pursue their private interest. We suggest that Boettke’s logic is analogous to that 
which might argue that private monopolists only set price at the profit-maximizing point 
because they lack the full knowledge of consumer demand schedules that would allow 
them to maximize each individual consumer’s surplus. 
In more nuanced versions of Boettke’s argument, benevolent planners do not simply 
become self-interested when confronted with their inability to calculate. Instead, the 
economic failure resulting from attempts at planning causes a political vacuum into 
which malevolent agents quickly rise.  We agree that the logic Hayek sets out in chapter 
10 of The Road to Serfdom applies to a polity that institutes a totalitarian political 
system: The worst will get on top in a polity where those “single-minded idealists” 
(Hayek 1994, p.61) united by a zeal for planning are allowed access to the  levers of 
power.7 We suggest that neither Hayek nor Boettke (2001, p.52), however, adequately 
                                                
7 Indeed, we argue (CF, p.5) that Hayek’s malign selection mechanism works to ensure that the worst will 
get on top where planners have calculative efficacy. 
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explain how selection effects conjunct with democratic politics work to get these “single-
minded idealists” into the candidate pool (let alone into office).  Austrian political 
economy fails to provide an account (model) – implicit or otherwise – of the way in 
which democratic constraints select candidates for office and for implemented policy. 
Subrick argues (p.5) that selection effects inherent to political markets may select into 
office “low-quality” (dishonest and incompetent) individuals. Presumably, however, the 
selection mechanisms characterizing “political markets” as diverse as Nazi Germany, 
Saddam’s Iraq, Britain circa 1945, New Zealand in 1984, and Sweden circa 2004 will not 
select for a uniformly “low quality” set of candidates for office nor for uniformly “low 
quality” policy.  
When a democratically elected benevolent planner encounters the failure of planning, we 
argue that a retreat from planning should prove more attractive an option than handing 
the levers of power over to a tyrant.  It is at this point that the empirical question becomes 
directly relevant.  How many Western European countries tried planning in Hayek’s 
sense? How many democratic polities went totalitarian as the price of enjoying the fruits 
of wholesale government planning?  Plus, we remind the reader that Hayek does argue 
that the welfare state leads to serfdom – simply “more slowly, indirectly, and 
imperfectly” (Hayek 1994 [1976], p.xxiii).  Hayek’s argument that the worst will rise to 
the top in a planned economy is not intended as a purely abstract argument: The 
argument provided in The Road to Serfdom is supposed to apply to the post 1945 Labour 
government in Britain (Hayek 1994 [1956], pp.xxxvii-xxxviii). Despite writing that 
“what the British experience convinces me … to be true, is that the unforeseen but 
inevitable consequences of socialist planning create a state of affairs in which, if the 
policy is to be pursued, totalitarian forces will get the upper hand” (Hayek 1994 [1956], 
p.xliii, italics added) Hayek simply does not ask whether ‘planning’ of the sort he has in 
mind (wholesale economic planning)8 is even an option on the menu of policy choices 
realistically available to any British government (Wiles, 1967, p.18). 9 
                                                
8 Hayek (1994 [1976], p.xxiii).  
9 Lavoie (1985, p.21, italics added) suggests that “[I]t does not matter who initially is put in charge or how 
much that person and his or her employees emphasize or love democracy.” Presumably, however, the 
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Finally, Subrick argues for a move away from highly stylized models (implicit or 
otherwise) of the type we provide in our paper (CF 2004), and towards the “realm of 
robust political economy” (Subrick p.10), an analytical realm that allows for the “dark 
side of the force” (p.10). We agree with Subrick that ever greater efforts are needed to 
accurately specify the planner objective function (Is the planner purely self- interested? A 
pure power maximizer? Or characterized by a far more complex utility function?) Thus, 
we wholeheartedly endorse Subrick’s call for political economists (Austrian or otherwise) 
to make explicit the institutional foundations underlying their analysis. 
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selection mechanisms which select for those who actually get to vote for or against implementing a policy of 
wholesale planning are of the utmost importance. Similarly, the extent to which such agents “love 
democracy” will determine their marginal willingness to trade-off the constraints of democratic politics for an 
ever more rigorous plan. Lavoie, of course, presupposes that a central planning authority is already in place, 
yet for us, why central planning is adopted is the question we suggest the Austrians fail to adequately 
answer. 
 
